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Abstract
Consider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m  n. Each
agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the
set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of \plausible" benchmark von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility functions in whose non-negative span his \true" utility is known to lie. An allo-
cation is undominated if there does not exist a preference-compatible prole of vNM utilities at
which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation,
we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a prole of vNM utilities at which it is is
ex-ante welfare maximizing. A nite set of preference-compatible vNM utility proles is exhib-
ited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing with respect to at
least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed
vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination.
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11 Introduction
In an in
uential paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4] consider the probabilistic assignment of n
indivisible objects to n agents. Agents are endowed with strict ordinal preferences over the set of
objects. Objects are assigned via lotteries, which, in light of the Birkho-von Neumann theorem [3],
can be represented by arrays of probabilities. To accommodate this probabilistic environment,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [4] adapt the familiar notion of Pareto eciency to random assignments
by introducing the concept of ordinal eciency. A random assigment is ordinally ecient if agents
cannot trade probability shares of objects to achieve a new random allocation that stochastically
dominates the original one. Bogomolnaia and Moulin show that ordinal eciency is equivalent
to the acyclicity of a particular kind of binary relation between objects.1 In a later contribution,
Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1] provide a dierent characterization of ordinal eciency based on
a novel concept of dominated sets of assignments. In recent years, ordinal eciency has been seen
as an important benchmark in random assignment and has motivated the study and comparison of
individual allocation mechanisms (Manea [9], Manea [11], Kesten [8], Che and Kojima [6]).
McLennan [12] oers a dierent characterization of ordinal eciency. He considers the weak pref-
erence domain and shows that an allocation is ordinally ecient if and only if it is ex-ante welfare
maximizing at some prole of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities, which is compatible with
the underlying ordinal preferences. In his proof, he establishes and uses a new version of the sepa-
rating hyperplane theorem. Manea [10] provides a simpler, constructive proof of McLennan's result
that is based on the acyclicity of the binary relation discussed in [4] and [7]. The constructed prole
of vNM utilities is related to a given weak representation of this (acyclic) binary relation.
In an important recent contribution Carroll [5] extends McLennan's characterization to economic
environments in which agents' preferences are incompletely known, so that an agent i's vNM utility
function is only assumed to lie in nonempty, convex, and relatively open sets Ui. He shows that if an
allocation is undominated (meaning that there exists no allocation that ex-ante dominates it for all
plausible utility functions), then this allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing at some vNM utility
functions ui 2 Ui. Similar to McLennan, Carroll employs a hyperplane-separation line of reasoning
and focuses on proving the existence of these utility functions (without actually exhibiting them).
Contribution. Our own economic environment is more general than McLennan's and consider-
ably less than Carroll's. Each agent i falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a
complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of \plausible" bench-
mark vNM utility functions (representing, say, dierent states of nature) in whose non-negative span
1Katta and Sethuraman [7] extend Bogomolnaia and Moulin's analysis to the weak preference domain.
2his \true" utility is known to lie.2 In this context, a vNM utility prole is said to be preference-
compatible if its individual vNM utility functions are consistent with all available ordinal information
for the rst category of agents, and lie in the non-negative span of the benchmark utility functions
of the latter.
Suppose an allocation is undominated, meaning that that there is no other allocation that is guar-
anteed to Pareto dominate it for all preference-compatible utility proles. Then, using the tools
of linear duality theory, a preference-compatible utility prole is constructed at which this alloca-
tion is ex-ante welfare maximizing. When there is full ordinal and no cardinal information, this
result recovers the ordinal eciency theorem due to McLennan [12]. Consequently, a nite set of
preference-compatible vNM proles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante
welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. A combinatorial upper bound is given
on the cardinality of this set. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the
constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination.
It is our hope that the simplicity of our LP-based approach may prove helpful in thinking about
related problems in the growing eld of random assignment.
Structure of the Paper. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model,
and Section 3.1 provides proofs of our main results based on LP duality. Section 3.2 generalizes
the approach pursued in Section 3.1 to arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily undominated) allocations
and oers an interpretation of the constructed vNM utility proles as subgradients of a function
measuring worst-case domination. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 Model Description
Consider an economy with a set N of n agents and M of m objects indexed by i = 1;2;:::;n
and j = 1;2;:::;m, respectively. Suppose without loss of generality that m  n, allowing for the
possibility of \dummy" objects that correspond to not being assigned anything at all.
Agents are partitioned in two groups NO and NC. Agents belonging in NO have ordinal preferences
over the set of objects that are expressed by the complete, re
exive and transitive relation i. Hence,
if objects j1 and j2 are such that j1 i j2 and j2 i j1 then agent i is indierent between them,
and this is denoted by j1 i j2. If j1 i j2, but j2 6i j1, then agent i strictly prefers object j1 to
j2, and this is denoted by j1 i j2.
Agents in NC have no such clear-cut ordinal information over preferences. Instead, they have a
2I am thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the adoption of a more general preference environment than
one that (solely) features complete ordinal preferences.
3set of plausible benchmark vNM utility functions ful
i : M 7! <; l 2 f1;2;:::;nigg in whose non-
negative span their \true" utility function is known to lie. In other words, they know that their
true utility will be equal to a non-negative linear combination of the benchmark ones. These sets
of vNM utilities, which t the far more general framework of Carroll [5], provide a way of imposing
structure on the utility functions that need to be considered.
In what follows, a prime symbol following a given (column) vector denotes the vector's transpose.
Throughout, we suppress the explicit dependence of our analysis on the economy's preferences. An
individual allocation for agent i is a non-negative column vector pi = (pi1;pi2;:::;pim)0 such that
P
j pij = 1. An allocation p = (p0
1;p0
2;:::;p0
n)0 is a concatenation of a set of individual allocations pi
for i = 1;2;:::;n that satises
P
i pij  1 for all j 2 M.3 Let P denote the set of all allocations.
Depending on whether an agent i belongs to NO or NC, an individual allocation pi dominates
another qi, whenever






qia; for all j 2 M; or








i(a)qia; for all l 2 f1;2;::;nig:
If at least one of the above inequalities is strict, then pi strictly dominates qi. The dominance
relation dened on an individual allocation extends to its economy-wide equivalent in a natural
way: an allocation p dominates an allocation q if pi dominates qi for every agent i; p strictly
dominates q if p dominates q, and if pi strictly dominates qi for some agent i. An allocation p is
said to be undominated if there does not exist an allocation q that strictly dominates it.
Adhering to our previous discussion, a prole of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions
~ u = (~ ui : M ! <; i 2 N) is said to be preference-compatible if
i 2 NO : ~ ui(j1)  ~ ui(j2) , j1 i j2; j1;j2 2 M; and





i(j); j 2 M; for some ~ wl
i  0
Finally, an allocation p is ex-ante welfare maximizing at a prole of vNM utilities ~ u if it maximizes






over the set of feasible allocations.
An example. To illustrate an instance of our model, consider an economy with three agents (1,
2 and 3) and three objects (a, b and c), in which NO = f1;2g and NC = f3g. Agent 1 strictly
3Note how the elements pij of p are positioned in lexicographic order. For reasons that will become apparent in
Section 3, we avoid the more common representation of an allocation as a sub-stochastic matrix.
4prefers object a to b and b to c. Agent 2 strictly prefers b to c and c to a. Agent 3 has no ordinal
information on his preferences; instead he is aware of three dierent benchmark vNM utilities that





3 = (100;5;1); u2
3 = (1;50;90); u3
3 = (43;45;44):
Clearly, agent 3 cannot determine a denitive ordinal ranking from the above information. Instead,












3  0; w2
3  0; w3
3  0g;
3 An Eciency Theorem
3.1 The Main results
In what follows, we use LP duality to prove the paper's main result.
Theorem 1 Suppose ^ p is undominated. There exists a preference-compatible prole of vNM utili-
ties at which ^ p is ex-ante welfare maximizing.
Proof. Consider an allocation ^ p 2 P. Where applicable, let 0 denote a zero vector of appropriate


















pik   rij =
X
kij








i(j)^ pij; l 2 f1;2;:::;nig; i 2 NC
m X
j=1
pij + sj = 1; i 2 N
n X
i=1
pij = 1; j 2 M
p  0; r  0; q  0; s  0: (1)
By denition, the solution (p;r;q;s) = (^ p;0;0;^ s), where ^ sj = 1  
P
i2N ^ pij, is feasible and estab-
lishes an upper bound of 0 for the problem's optimal cost (i.e., objective value).
Using the denition of domination, it is easy to see that ^ p is undominated if and only if the optimal
solution (p;r;q;s) of the primal problem (1) is equal to (^ p;0;0;^ s), thus yielding an optimal
cost of 0.
































i(j)wil + yi + zj  0; j 2 M; i 2 NC
x  1; w  1
y free variable; z  0: (2)
By strong duality (see Theorem 4.4 in [2]), the primal problem has an optimal cost of 0 (which, as
mentioned before, is equivalent to ^ p being undominated) if and only if the optimal solution of the






















^ zj = 0: (3)
Now, let ^ u denote a prole of von-Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) utilities such that, for all j 2 M,








i(j) ^ wil; (4)
Recall that since (^ x; ^ w;^ y;^ z) is feasible, we must have (^ x; ^ w)  1. In combination with Eqs. (4),
this immediately establishes that ^ u is preference-compatible. (Note how when an agent i 2 NO is
indierent between two objects, they are assigned equal utility.) Rearranging terms, Eq. (3) can be






































Again by dual feasibility we must have
0  ^ ui(j)   (^ yi + ^ zj) (6)




























^ ui(j)^ pij: (7)
4For details see Chapter 4.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2].
5The \hat" notation is adopted to denote the dependence of the optimal dual variables on ^ p.
6This observation concludes the proof.
Thus, we have constructed a preference-compatible utility prole ^ u at which the undominated
allocation ^ p is ex-ante welfare maximizing. Before we prove our next result we focus on the feasible
region of the dual LP (2) and note that no variable yi can ever be strictly positive. Thus, we can








i(j)wil + yi + zj  0; j 2 M; i 2 NC
x  1; w  1
y  0; z  0: (8)
We now provide a denition for the extreme points of a polyhedron.
Denition 1 An extreme point of a polyhedron  is a vector v1 2  such that we cannot nd two
vectors v1;v2 2 , both dierent from v1, and a scalar  2 [0;1] that satisfy v1 = v2 +(1 )v3:
In other words, an extreme point is an element of a polyhedron which cannot be written as a convex
combination of two other elements (of the polyhedron), which are both distinct from it. Extreme
points will play an important role in our next result.6
Theorem 2 There exists a nite set of preference-compatible utility proles such that every un-
dominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing for at least one of this set's elements. This set
has cardinality no more than the number of extreme points of polyhedron (8).
Proof. The set of (updated) dual constraints fx  1;w  1;y  0;z  0g, ensures that the
dual feasible region (8) is a polyhedron that does not contain a line (see Denition 2.12 in [2]).
Consequently, Theorem 2.6 of [2] implies that the dual feasible region contains at least one extreme
point.
Let E denote the set of all extreme points of (8). By Theorem 2.3 and Corollary 2.1 in [2] its




, where a represents the number of constraints and b the number
of variables of polyhedron (8). For every extreme point e = (xe;we;ye;ze) 2 E, introduce a vNM
utility prole ue consistent to Eq. (4) such that






6I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing attention to this result.







Now, let ^ P denote the set of undominated allocations and consider an arbitrary ^ p 2 ^ P and the
associated dual LP (2). By Theorem 2.8 of [2], the optimum of this dual LP must be attained at
some extreme point e of (8). Consider the vNM utility prole ue as given by Eq. (9) for extreme
point e. Following the logic of Theorem 1, the allocation ^ p will be ex-ante welfare maximizing at
ue. Noting that the feasible region of LP (2) (represented by polyhedron (8)), and therefore its
nite set of extreme points, is unaltered by changes in the dual's objective function, and repeating
our argument for any element of ^ P establishes the result.
Remarks. The equivalence between extreme points and basic feasible solutions of a polyhedron
(Theorem 2.3 in [2]) provides algebraic insight into the structure of the extreme points of (8) and
gives a sense of their total number.7 Indeed, applying this equivalence result to the special structure
of polyhedron (8),in order to actually count its extreme points is an interesting combinatorial
exercise in its own right. Having said this, the bound of Theorem 2 can be made considerably













j < 0; for all j 2 M; for some i 2 NC.
This is because feasible points satisfying the above conditions cannot, by rst principles, be optimal:
increasing the xik or wil variables until one of the above constraints binds will increase the objective
function value without resulting in infeasibility.
3.2 An interpretation of the constructed vNM Utilities
In this section, we make a more general connection between undominatedness and the prole of vNM
utilities discussed in Section 3. Indeed, duality theory lends the constructed vNM utility prole ^ u
of Theorem 1 a particular kind of interpretation, regardless of whether the candidate allocation ^ p
is undominated. We begin by dening the concept of a subgradient that is commonly encountered
in convex analysis.
Denition 2 Let f : X ! < denote a convex function dened on a convex set X. Let ^ x 2 X. A
vector v belonging in the ambient space of X is a subgradient of f at ^ x if
f(^ x) + v  (x   ^ x)  f(x); 8x 2 X:
7For more details on polyhedra and extreme points, the reader is referred to Section 2.2 in [2].
8Returning to our model, let ~ p 2 P and dene the vector-valued function









entries of the right-hand-side of the constraint vector of primal problem (1) applied to an allocation
~ p. That is,
i 2 NO : g(~ p)ij =
X
kij
~ pik; j 2 M




i(j)~ pij; l 2 f1;2;:::;nig:
Next, given two vectors x 2 <jNOjm and w 2 <
P




i2NC ni ! <nm
where u(x;w) consistent with Eq. (4). Echoing Eq. (5) in the proof of Theorem 1, we can rearrange
terms and establish the following identity for all ~ p 2 P
(x;w)0g(~ p) = u(x;w)
0~ p: (10)
We use the primal problem (1) to dene an allocation's eciency decit as the negative of the
greatest amount by which it can be dominated by another feasible allocation. Or, equivalently, as
the greatest combined ordinal and cardinal eciency loss that its application can result in. Let F(^ p)
denote the feasible region of the primal problem (1) as a function of a candidate allocation ^ p 2 P.
The eciency decit of an allocation ^ p is dened as the optimal cost of the primal problem (1)
when the allocation appearing in the right-hand-side of the constraints is given by ^ p. Formally, it
is denoted by a function D : P ! <  such that















Proposition 1 The eciency decit D() is a piecewise-linear convex function on the set P.
Proof. Recall the proof of Theorem 2 and consider the set of extreme points E of the updated dual
feasible region (8). We may write









0^ p + (ye;ze)0(1;1)

: (11)
9Since the maximum of a set of linear (and therefore convex) functions is itself convex, the result
follows.
We are now ready to generalize the insights obtained in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 Consider an allocation ^ p 2 P and the associated primal LP (1). Suppose the vector
(^ x; ^ w;^ y;^ z) is an optimal solution of the associated dual LP (2) and consider the vNM utility prole
^ u given by Eq. (4). This prole is (a) preference-compatible, and (b) a subgradient of the eciency
decit D at ^ p.
Proof. Part (a) follows immediately from dual feasibility. We turn to part (b). The simple
argument follows the proof of Theorem 5.2 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [2]. Strong duality implies
that
(^ x; ^ w;^ y;^ z)0(g(^ p);1;1) = D(^ p)
(10)







^ zj = D(^ p):
Consider now an arbitrary ~ p 2 P. By weak duality (see Theorem 4.3 in [2]), we have







^ zj  D(~ p):
Hence, we may conclude that
u(^ x; ^ w)
0(~ p   ^ p)  D(~ p)   D(^ p); for all ~ p 2 P:
4 Directions for Future Research
The results in this paper provide a concise characterization of eciency in environments with a mix
of ordinal and cardinal information on agent preferences. In particular, an allocation is undominated
if and only if its eciency decit a piecewise-linear convex function on the set of allocations, is zero.
We believe that this insight, coupled with the more general optimization framework explored in this
work, may prove useful in future research in random-assignment and house-allocation models. In
particular, one may frame dierent kinds of existence questions by setting up a trivial optimization
problem (i.e., one with a zero objective), imposing as constraints desired properties of eciency,
equity, and voluntary participation, and examining its dual. A similar approach may be helpful
in the comparison of individual allocation mechanisms; in particular, one can attempt to provide
bounds on the dierence of their ex-ante welfare, for a range of preference-compatible utility proles.
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